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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-CUSTOMARY VIOLATION
oF STATUTE BY DEFENDANT AS BEARING oN IssuE oF PLAINTIFF's CoNTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-Plaintiff's empty truck, proceeding uphill, collided

RECENT DECISIONS

on plaintiff's side of the road with defendant's loaded truck which was traveling
in the opposite direction. Both trucks were engaged in the same road-surfacing
project. The road had a washout on defendant's side. Defendant's answer
alleged that there was an established custom under which drivers of empty
trucks yielded the right of way to drivers of loaded trucks when about to meet
in a narrow or defective place in the highway; that defendant relied upon such
custom which plaintiff failed to observe; and that the plaintiff's failure to
observe the custom constituted contributory negligence. The trial court granted
the plaintiff's motion to strike these allegations on the ground that they constituted no defense for defendant's failure to obey a statute.1 On appeal, held,
reversed. While the custom pleaded cannot be invoked to prove that defendant
exercised due care, it can be considered in determining whether plaintiff was
free from contributory negligence. Langnerv. Caviness, (Iowa 1947) 28 N.W.

(2d) 421.
Although there is some authority for the proposition that a driver may p1ace
absolute reliance on others to observe the laws of the road fully and operate
their vehicles with due care, 2 it is generally held that such assumption cannot
be made where it appears, or reasonably should appear, that the other party is
not going to obey the statute.3 There is little authority on the question whether
evidence of customary violation of a statute by persons in defendant's circumstances is admissible to show absence of due care on the part of the plaintiff when
plaintiff knows, or should know, of the custom. Cases cited in the principal
case support admission of the evidence for such purpose.4 In determining what a
driver must do to exercise due care for his own safety, it would seem material
to consider what reasonable expectations he might entertain concerning the
probable conduct of the party who approaches from the opposite direction.
Whether one may reasonably expect another to act in a certain way should be
determined by reference not only to the conduct required of him by statute, but
also by the action customarily taken by persons in his position. 5 While cases
1 Iowa Code (1946) § 321.298 ("Persons on horseback, or in vehicles, including
motor vehicles, meeting each other on the public highway, shall give one-half of the
traveled way thereof by turning to the right'').
2 Ford v. Tremont Lumber Co., 123 La. 742, 49 S. 492 (1909); Zorn v. Britton,
120 Fla. 304, 162 s. 879 (1935); 7 TULANE L. REV. 463 (1933); 19 TULANE
L. REV. 300 (1944).
8 Kerr v. Hayes, 250 Mich. 19, 229 N.W. 430 (1930); Eaton v. Ambrose, 133
Me. 458, 180 A. 363 (1935); 38 AM. JuR. 871; 14 BOOT. UNiv. L. REv. 155
(1934); 4 DuKE B.A.J. 38 (1936).
4 Hensen v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 71, 118 A. 464 (1922); Tobin v.
Goodwin, 157 Wash. 658, 290 P. 215 (1930); Mann v. Standard Oil Co., 129 Neb.
226, 261 N.W. 168 (1935). While these cases do not involve direct holdings on
the same facts as the principal case, they do support its decision. See also Pollock v.
Hamm, 177 Ark. 348, 6 S.W. (2d) 541 (1928), holding that evidence of customary
violation of statute was admissible on question whether violator was contributorily negligent. For decisions in accord with the principal case where the master-servant relationship exists, see 33 L.R.A. (n.s.) 646 (19II); Abbott v. McCadden, 81 Wis. 563,
51 N.W. 1079 (1892).
5 Muir v. Cheney Bros., 64 Cal. App. (2d) 55, 148 P. (2d) 138 (1944).
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may be found 6 containing the fl.at statement that evidence of a custom contrary
to statute is inadmissible, the reason for such holding is that its introduction was
sought for the purpose of proving that the defendant was not negligent, even
though he violated the statute. 7 Thus, these cases are properly decided. But
they do not consider the exact question involved in the principal case. Although
admission of such evidence may result in the defendant's successful evasion of the
statute as concerns civil liability, this result is in accord with the theory behind
the doctrine of contributory negligence, 8 and there is little reason to regard
statute law with more sanctity- than common law. Whether the defendant's
negligence consists of breach of statute or of a common law duty has no final
bearing on the question of liability; the plaintiff's contributory negligence may
defeat recovery in either case. Danger of misuse of such evidence by the jury
will be present only in states which follow the rule that violation of a statute is
merely evid~nce of negligence, and such danger can be avoided by proper instructions. While the fact·that one has the statutory right of way tends to make
his assumption that others will give way to the right in obedience to the statutory
duty a reasonable assumption, nevertheless courts should not sanction the closing
of one's eyes to obvious danger by strict reliance on statutory right of way, when
one should know that under the circumstances others customarily do not, and
probably will not, obey the statute. "In many cases to insist on a technical right
of way would be the height of recklessness." 9
James A. Sprunk

6 Casey v. Boyer, 270 Pa. 492, 113 A. 364 (1921); Frame v. Arrow Towing
Service, 155 Ore. 522, 64 P. (2d) 1312 (1937).
7 Since custom is only evidence of what is proper and reasonable, if a statute has
set the standard of reasonable conduct a customary violation of the statute cannot lower
this standard. Myrtle Point Transportation Co. v. Port of Coquille River, 86 Ore.311, 168 P. 625 (1917); Muir v. Cheney Bros., 64 Cal. App. (2d) 55, 148 P. (2d)
138 (1944); 2 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 461 (1940); I THOMPSON, NEGI,1GENCE, 2d ed., § 32 (1901).
8 PROSSER, ToRTS 393 (1941); 2 ToRTS RESTATEMENT 1227 (1934).
9 14 BosT. UNIV. L. REv. 155 at 158 (1934).

